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the unity of all phenomena, it follows easily that the ethical end is continual self-development.

But is such development possible? Will not death prevent it? In the appendices to *Know Thyself*, Varisco discusses in what sense the problem of immortality is valid as a problem. Consonantly with his phenomenism, he maintains that the problem in one form, namely, that in which the Subject is conceived as a substance, is fictitious. The real problem, he says, is whether the particular *unity of phenomena* we call a conscious Subject will survive death; for the conception of immortality does not fall with the conception of substantiality. But this question, like the supreme question of all, that which asks, "Theism or Pantheism?" is left unsolved by Varisco. The obstruction in the way of a solution is believed to be but temporary, and the author decides for himself, though for no *reasons* at all, in favour of Theism.

The present works exhibit throughout a high moral enthusiasm. The author's style is terse and unadorned. The expression of his thought is vigorous, although there is in general a far higher proportion of confident statement than of argument. He is obviously interested above all things in the destiny of man.

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POLITICAL IDEALS; THEIR NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT. By C. Delisle Burns. Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1915. Pp. 311.

This is an unusually well-planned, well-written and interesting book. Its thesis is "that modern politics is governed by the conceptions men have of a state of things which would be better than the present." By this Mr. Burns seems to mean very much what Mr. A. V. Dicey meant in his *Law and Public Opinion*, with this difference—that while Mr. Dicey showed in detail with what sensitive closeness the development of English law and institutions followed the current of public opinion in a single century, Mr. Burns aims at showing the same thing happening as it were in bulk. He holds that all through history the main factors determining the nature of political institutions have been these conceptions, which he calls political ideals and which Mr.

Dicey would call public opinion, and he accordingly sets himself to trace in bold outlines the history of this causal relation.

Beginning with ancient Athens, and confining himself to those great movements of opinion which embody ideals still alive to-day, he unfolds his story roughly as follows. In Athens was born the ideal of liberty—for the group self-government, for the individual “freedom of mind from the trivial cares of food and clothing,” so that each man, while subject to the reign of law, was free to lead the “good life,” with the results in art, science, and speculation that we know. In spite of the narrowness of the Greek conception, which excluded slaves and women, the Athenian experiment in democratic government, “fatal as it was to themselves,” left this legacy to the world—the conviction that each man ought to have free development, and that each ought to concern himself with the business of the State. Rome’s contribution, on the other hand, was order, the complement of liberty, but Rome broke up because her order, in whose shadow the barbarians had grown strong, turned to tyranny. Then, with Christianity and Stoicism, the slaves and barbarians came, sentimentally at least, into their own; the conception of cosmopolitan equality took root, not indeed as a political program but as a sentiment, and was to some extent carried on in that fantastic embodiment of the medieval ideal of unity, the Holy Roman Empire. In the middle ages modern Europeans felt themselves to be of one family; the ecclesiastical system and the mediæval criteria of social rank had a cosmopolitan validity; and this ideal of European unity is still effective in two forms, one good and one bad—the concert of Europe, and the German theory of Teutonic domination. With the Renaissance, under pressure of the need to substitute strong government for local anarchies, European unity faded before the ideal of the sovereign state, an ideal bearing in its bosom the seed of modern nationalism, and itself half good and half bad; good in so far as it allowed different communities to develop independently, and bad because it involved opposition between groups, dynastic wars, and the barren struggle for the balance of power. The French Revolution redressed the balance by proclaiming those rights of the individual which the Renaissance theory of sovereignty had affronted; and with the revolutionary ideal of the political equality and freedom of all adults, we have come round once more to something like the old Greek conception of freedom,

only translated into modern terms. Mr. Burns next discusses two antagonisms, as they are commonly conceived, between ideals which are very powerful in the modern world. There is the clash between Nationalism and Imperialism; Nationalism so valuable to humanity for the preservation of the richness of diverse types, for its fostering of characteristic laws and institutions, and so pernicious with its jingoism and its narrow political outlook; and Imperialism, which, while apt to degenerate into stupid belief in the virtue of material force, has the merit of extending single systems of law and government over many different lands and races. Finally, there is the seeming conflict between Individualism and Socialism, both ministering to a want of the soul and both aiming by different means at the same end—free opportunity for full development of every member of the group.

There is much to be said for Mr. Burns' view that the history of ideals is the only kind of history worth writing. But, as his purpose is not mainly historical, I shall not discuss that point. His purpose is mainly ethical; he is concerned, he says, only with "the ethical standard which embodies itself in a political ideal," and if his method is historical, that is only because, unless we understand how our ideals are inherited from the past, we can not value them properly. And in fact the most valuable feature of Mr. Burns' book is the soundness of his ethical judgments; he sees all round our ideals, he is never led astray by claptrap. He is enthusiastic for what is good in them, yet at each stage of his historical review he balances the pros and cons with the disinterestedness of a Sidgwick. But there seems to be some confusion as to the function of historical criticism in producing this attitude. The study of history may cool our approval of Imperialism or our condemnation of Renaissance sovereignty, because it tells us that the pursuit of certain goods in a certain way has actually been attended by certain evils; but it can hardly throw light on the goodness or badness of any particular ideal in itself. If Mr. Burns merely means that history helps us to judge justly by instilling that disillusionment which is the most powerful antidote to the transient passions of the moment, he is no doubt right. But he often speaks as if he meant more than that,—as if, for instance, the knowledge that liberty was invented at Athens were relevant to the question how far liberty is desirable.

Turning to details, the reader will find, among much that is sound, some questionable matter; that is inevitable, for no one can cover so vast a field without exciting some objection, and where so many moral judgments are passed it is unlikely that all should be convincing. One striking weakness is the treatment of the relation between mediæval and modern ideals. Too high a value seems to be assigned to the mediæval conception of European civilization as a unity, and to its survival in our own day; here those who think that Hindus and Chinese are as civilized as ourselves will not be in sympathy with Mr. Burns. On the other hand, status, that fundamental presupposition of mediæval society, is hardly touched upon, and its value is underestimated. The notion that a man's income and opportunities, his rights and duties, are automatically fixed for him at birth, instead of depending on his merit or earning-power, has its good side, which, as Mr. Burns does not notice, has unconsciously become part of the ideal of socialism.

At the same time it would be hard to name any recent book that combines so keen a sense for history with such philosophical breadth and impartiality. It may be objected that Mr. Burns has produced a hybrid thing, neither philosophy nor history. But the fact remains that he has an advantage over most historians in maintaining a serene and lofty detachment of tone which is very impressive, and an advantage over most philosophers in that his plan enables him to sprinkle his work with acute and well-considered reflections on topics of living interest to all intelligent citizens.

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POLITICS AND CROWD MORALITY: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS. By Arthur Christensen. Translated from the Danish by A. Cecil Curtis. London: Williams & Norgate, 1915. Pp. 270.

The Analysis of the mental and emotional life of crowds is interesting, but the author underrates a characteristic of crowds which no advocate of any movement of reform can have missed, though it is probably more marked in scattered than in local crowds: namely, their apathy, and inaccessibility to new concep-